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Righting Names
The Importance of Native American Philosophies 
of Naming for Environmental Justice 
Rebekah Sinclair
  ABSTRACT: Controlling the names of places, environments, and species is one way in 
which settler colonial ontologies delimit the intelligibility of ecological relations, Indig-
enous peoples, and environmental injustices. To counter this, this article amplifi es the 
voices of Native American scholars and foregrounds a philosophical account of Indige-
nous naming. First, I explore some central characteristics of Indigenous ontology, epis-
temic virtue, and ethical responsibility, setting the stage for how Native nami ng draws 
these elements together into a complete, robust philosophy. Th en I point toward leading 
but contingent principles of Native naming, foregrounding how Native names emerge 
from and create communities by situating (rather than individuating) the beings that 
they name within kinship structures, including human and nonhuman agents. Finally, 
I outline why and how Indigenous names and the knowledges they contain are crucial 
for both resisting settler violence and achieving environmental justice, not only for 
Native Americans, but for their entire animate communities.
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A name is a site of power. Th is is true in part because of the concrete power—oft en politi-
cal, hierarchical, statist, and colonial—that determines who gets to name whom. But for many 
American Indian philosophies, names also come with their own power; names have power to 
create or destroy worlds, build or raze relationships, and embed their bearers in networks of 
being and meaning that extend far beyond the “human.” Furthermore, acts of naming in Native 
philosophies do not simply pick out singular, complete entities; rather, naming is a humble, 
communal, educational enactment of the ways in which Native Americans know and relate to 
their world and each other. 
Th is diff ers from dominant, settler colonial philosophies in which, according to Saul Kripke, 
names individuate and pick out entities from their environment rather than situate and embed 
them within it. As Viola Cordova suggests, Western names tend to refer to “static nouns” (2007: 
100). Names enclose and capture unifi ed, essential identities in exclusive possession of defi nable 
and stable traits, consistent in time and space. Th ey designate individuals, not a relational node 
in a network, a personality that can shift  between bodies, or a complex multiplicity. In Western 
philosophy, naming is connected to a particular ontology that understands individuals as the 
fundamental units of reality and thus of ecology, biology, anthropology, politics, ethics, law, and 
so on. 
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Why is this important for thinking about environmental management from an environmen-
tal justice perspective? Because while settler colonialism is foremost about the ongoing dis-
possession of land (Alfred 2012; Tuck and Yang 2012), it includes the ongoing imposition of 
Western “processes of ordering” the world that continually dispossess and disallow Indigenous 
ways of managing land and relations with their peopled communities (Snelgrove et al. 2014; 
Standing Bear 2006; Whitt 2009; Wildcat 2009; Wolfe 2006). In North America, environmental 
management practices and policies have long participated in settler dismissal of Indigenous 
knowledges and needs. Such practices typically rely on settler knowledges of land, ecosystems, 
and bodies, and oft en seize control of environmental resources to which American Indian tribes 
have claim through complicated “bureaucratic processes that oft en confl ict with Indigenous 
cultural orientations towards the natural world” (Richmond et al. 2013: 3). Even when envi-
ronmental policies are aimed at including American Indian voices in practices of comanage-
ment, they oft en lack the infrastructure or resources to follow through (Middleton 2013), or 
fi nd Indigenous naming and knowledge of nature incompatible with the Western values that 
drive environmental policy (Watson 2013). For example, when Koyukon elders tried to clarify 
their concern regarding the decline in migrating birds in the Koyukuk/Nowitna wildlife refuge, 
their local knowledges and oral histories about the frequency of “speckled-bellies” (the Koyu-
kon name for white-fronted geese) did not meet conservation biology’s standards for scientifi c 
quantifi cation. Koyukon counting did not count, so no preservation or management plan was 
put in place despite the bird’s absence (Watson 2013).
In short, one can exist on one’s traditional lands and still have the use, development, and 
names of the lands and creatures altered so radically that Indigenous communities are still onto-
logically and epistemologically displaced (Alfred 2012). In particular, settler colonial namings, 
naming practices, education, and language colonization have dramatically altered American 
Indian engagement with the “material and social world . . . thus preventing ontological security.” 
Controlling the proper names of human or nonhuman persons—that is, the name that is ethical 
or appropriate—is one way in which settler colonialism and environmental management prac-
tices erase Native American knowledges and ontologies (Bang and Marin 2015: 541; see also 
Lomawaima 2007). In other words, “naming is the site at which issues with references between 
Western and Indigenous epistemologies unfold” (Bang et al. 2014: 11, emphasis added).
Where I live as a settler and guest in Kalapuya territory, in central Oregon, the names of 
lands, places, rivers, seasons, directions, and species have been changed. Th is is true for most 
territories of Turtle Island, or the land settlers now call North America. Changing the names 
obscures and destroys not only American Indian cultures and languages but also the familial and 
ethical relations represented and brought about by those names. Th e result is that very pressing 
problems—like water rights, use and distribution of “resources,” ecosystem management, and 
invasive species solutions—are all operating without Indigenous ontologies and epistemolo-
gies represented in those names. For example, using settler colonial names for the Chicago and 
Des Plaines rivers, rather than using their Indigenous names also or instead—Sikaakwa (Miami 
for “skunk place” or “onion fi eld”) (Callary 2009), and Sheshikmaoshike sepe (Potawatomi for 
“river of the trees which fl ow,” referring to sugar maple trees and their sap) (Vogel 1962)—not 
only establishes settler temporalities, placing Indigenous names and lands in the past. It also 
erases important relational realities about the land itself: realities about the kinds of things that 
grow and live there, how the rivers interact with the wetlands, and thus how to restore or make 
healthy the spaces currently occupied or corroded by settler extractive technologies. In other 
words, not only are the regional knowledges and networks held within the names lost, but this 
loss has all manner of consequences for our ability to come up with holistic, creative, and just 
environmental policies (Bang and Marin 2015). 
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Furthermore, as new names and designations arise in environmental movements—names 
like “invasive species”—they are mostly distributed by non-Indigenous activists or scientists 
outside of contact with Native American peoples and thus do not refl ect Native relational 
philosophies. Yet these new designations are oft en and nonetheless the only way of rendering 
legible Indigenous claims against settler colonial technologies or troubling species management 
practices. Th rough their control of names, settler colonial ontologies control how ecological 
relations, environmental injustices, and Indigenous bodies are intelligible, making it diffi  cult 
for Indigenous peoples to clarify harms against their peopled communities, where people, for 
Th omas Norton-Smith (2010), includes animals, plants, and land and where a person is not an 
individual but, as Megan Bang and Ananda Marin (2015) suggest, a set of relations. As Bang and 
colleagues remind us, the anthropocentrism at work in Western ontology and naming is itself 
a form of “dispossession and epistemic violence,” as it erases the agency and value of the non-
human peoples with whom Native Americans build their communities (2014: 8). 
For centuries, American Indians have resisted settler colonialism and its extractive, eradi-
catory, domesticating violence on Native communities, creatures, and lands precisely through 
radical acts of naming and renaming. In his essay about the importance of Native studies, Peter 
Kulchyski even argues that the interdisciplinary work done by Native studies can be summarized 
as “the setting right of names, the righting of names as much as the writing of names” (2000: 13). 
Yet there exists no extensive, systematic account to express why and how those names matter, or 
to explain how Indigenous names designate relations and networks, rather than individuals, and 
to explore how they enact and perform relational ontologies, creating tangible bonds broken by 
settler renaming or misnaming. 
Th is article thus weaves together Native philosophies, philosophy of language, Indigenous 
stories of naming and resistance, and anthropological literature on American Indian naming to 
create a fuller picture of Indigenous philosophies of naming.1 Importantly, I am not creating a 
Native philosophy of naming from fragmented stories that lack philosophical rigor or require 
translation. Th at kind of project would reproduce Western philosophy’s condescending, deri-
sive treatment of Indigenous thought. Instead, following Norton-Smith, I highlight the fact that 
American Indian philosophies of naming are robust and fully formed, already present within 
and demonstrated by Native practices and beliefs (2010: 2). I want to learn from these philoso-
phies, foregrounding Native voices, to emphasize the importance of names and the knowledges 
they contain for building and sustaining Indigenous communities beyond the human. Native 
names must become central for environmental justice to resist settler colonial violence against 
all members of Native communities.
 First, I explore some central principles regarding Native American ontological theory, epis-
temic virtue, and ethical responsibility, setting the stage for how Native naming uniquely con-
nects these three elements into a complete, robust philosophy. Th ough these philosophies may 
share commonalities with Indigenous philosophies from elsewhere in the world, this article 
focuses on American Indian philosophies because I am a settler occupying Native American 
lands, and my responsibility is to learn from and defer to these specifi c communities in their 
quests for environmental justice. 
Amplifying the work of many American Indian authors and allies, I then focus on several 
principles or characteristics of Indigenous naming. In general, I note that Native American 
names tend to emerge from communities to expand or reaffi  rm those communities and are 
embedded in networks of consensual action by many other respectful agents (including the 
names themselves). Names are also intended to recall and secure knowledge of particular asso-
ciations and relations, so they do not individuate but rather situate and embed what we might 
call “individuals-in-relations” within specifi c kinship structures. 
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Finally, I consider how decolonizing Native naming practices, and deferring to or including 
Indigenous names, is paramount for pursuits of environmental justice, as well as for accurately 
understanding the environmental and ecological relations to which Indigenous names refer and 
in which Native lives are embedded. Hope for environmental justice and for revitalizing land, 
recovering species, and so on, resides in affi  rming Indigenous names.
Native Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics
Before diving into Native philosophy of naming and its distinct ontological, epistemological, 
and ethical implications, let me clarify what exactly American Indian scholars mean by ontol-
ogy, epistemology, and ethics. Can we even make claims about Native ontology without erasing 
important diff erences between various Native American philosophies?
For Cordova (2007), Norton-Smith (2010), Donald Fixico (2003), Anne Waters (2004), and 
others, there is no singular or unifi ed Native American philosophy: only philosophies. Th ere 
have always been and continue to be irreducible diff erences between the hundreds of American 
Indian cultures, lifeways, and philosophies. In maintaining their vital diff erences, Native Amer-
icans have resisted both homogenization by Western philosophies and assimilation by Western 
culture. Yet Cordova suggests that American Indians have begun recognizing that they “have 
more in common with other indigenous groups, regardless of their obvious diff erences, than 
they do with the conceptual framework of the European colonizer.” Cordova argues that it is 
“possible to identify some of the conceptual commonalities shared by Native Americans,” yet 
these commonalities are recognized and thematized by Native Americans themselves, not the 
colonial, Western eye (2007: 102). Even as Norton-Smith rejects a monolithic set of American 
Indian beliefs, he argues for the importance of recognizing “themes” and “principles” that “seem 
to occur across American Indian traditions” (2010: 3). Furthermore, Anne Waters and Agnes 
Curry (2009) suggest American Indians recognize commonalities for specifi c reasons. For 
example, commonalities help form an argument in defense of American Indian philosophies as 
fully formed worlds (Norton-Smith 2010). In short, these represent goal-oriented eff orts (taken 
up at specifi c times for specifi c reasons), directed by American Indians themselves, to reject 
overarching, unifying theories by respecting diff erences while also recognizing important con-
nections. In lieu of addressing a single Native ontology, epistemology, or ethics, I defer to Native 
American scholars who address contingent commonalities among irreducibly plural American 
Indian ontologies, epistemologies, and ethics.
Ontology is the aspect of philosophy that considers the nature of being or of what is. Waters 
claims that Indigenous ontologies build worlds that are multiplicitous, fl uid, complex, relational, 
and entangled. Th ey affi  rm the change of categories and identities rather than permanence and 
fi xed essence. Summarizing the distinctions between Western and Native American ontolo-
gies, Waters suggests that Indigenous “ontology, as animate (continuously alterable),” and thus 
open to change rather than fi xed, “will be inclusive (nonbinary) rather than exclusive (discrete 
binary), and have nondiscrete (unbounded) entities rather than discrete (discretely bounded) 
entities” (2004: 107). Jarrad Reddekop describes Native ontologies as being characterized by 
relationships, “beginning with an assumption that relations are prior, that any atomistic ‘thing’ 
is rather only a kind of (at least temporary) fi xity or concrescence, a gathering constituted in and 
through these prior, dynamic, and contextual relations.” Native relational ontologies thus focus 
on what “happens between (including between levels of structure) rather than focusing on sup-
posedly individual things, and indeed do so as a way of understanding what any particular thing 
is at any given time” (2014: 35). By doing this, Native languages, systems of categorization, and 
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orderings represent wholly diff erent worlds: “diff erent words make diff erent worlds” (Norton-
Smith 2010: 6). Th at is, Indigenous ontologies and beliefs create complete if open systems that 
“have the power to orient us in life” (Hester and Cheney 2001: 319). 
For American Indian philosophies, epistemology—the study of knowledge and truth—is not 
independent from ethics, since knowledge is oft en contingent on knowing rightly, or in ways 
that help the community. In Indigenous epistemologies, the world does not need to be poked, 
prodded, controlled, and dissected in order to discover its inner meanings. American Indian 
truths are fundamentally guided by the right actions, the right goals, or what Lee Hester and 
Jim Cheney call responsible knowledge (“responsible truths”) and an “ethical-epistemological 
orientation of attentiveness” rather than of domination (2001: 319–320). For Norton-Smith, we 
know our knowledge is true when it is characterized by “a respectful success in achieving a goal” 
(2010: 64). Knowledge is thus based on a particular context: “Without context there can be no 
knowledge, or knowing, and hence knowledge exists only when belief practices develop, are in 
harmony with communal well-being” (Simpson 2014: xxi). In other words, how we come to 
understand infl ects and colors the things that we know, and what we know needs to be directly 
related to helping our community (Cajete 2000, 2004; Jojola 2004). Vine Deloria suggests that 
“no body of knowledge exists for its own sake outside the moral framework of understanding” 
(1999: 47). So knowledge must be both respectful and useful for the community: these are the 
ways of determining the success or accuracy of knowledge (Basso 1996; Simpson 2014). 
Furthermore, Indigenous epistemologies are characterized by humility. Th ere are no bare 
facts (Deloria 1999; Norton-Smith 2010; Whitt 2009). Native American philosophies do not 
assume that the structures of our minds have unmitigated access to the inherent, permanent, 
and discrete structures of the universe, and instead recognize that no set of beliefs or knowledge 
is ever value neutral. American Indian epistemologies tend to affi  rm both the world and their 
ontological maps of the world, but do not confuse one for the other, as Western sciences and 
epistemologies oft en do (Norton-Smith 2010). 
Th at respectful practices are built into epistemologies bespeaks the centrality of ethics for 
Indigenous worlds. According to Cordova, Native American ethics prioritizes the “we” over the 
“I,” understanding all life as fundamentally social and reliant, while simultaneously rejecting 
hierarchical ways of organizing those relations (2004: 177). Instead of seeing hierarchies, Native 
ethics affi  rm diff erences between creatures, land, and forces, all of whom equally “participate 
in the continuing creation of reality” (Deloria 1999: 47) Th is “‘complete’ system” of ethics, as 
Cordova names it, includes responsibility not only for other members of society—which, as we 
recall, extends well beyond the human—but also “toward the planet which has produced one 
and upon which one is dependent” (177).
Importantly, these ethics are not strictly deployed with other humans, but are exchanges 
between the entire peopled world, where “people” includes plants, places, lands, animals, 
and so on (Atleo 2011; Callicot 1989; Cordova 2004; Jojola 2004; McPherson and Rabb 2011; 
Norton-Smith 2010; Whitt 2009). In their sweeping account of the connections between ethics, 
land, and personhood, Dennis McPherson and Douglas Rabb clarify that “a person is someone 
with whom our relationships may be, indeed must be, evaluated morally” (2011: 89). Th ese 
personal relations are so intertwined that disrupting Indigenous relations to land and fellow 
peopled communities can be considered a way of disrupting their personhood (Alfred 2012; 
Bang and Marin 2015; Corntassel et al. 2009; Tuck and Yang 2012). 
Th is connection between the animals, the environment, and personhood is central for 
understanding what ethics and justice mean for American Indian communities. In order to be 
in ethical relations with Native American peoples—to speak of the rights of or duties to Native 
American communities in terms of environmental justice—we must speak about the whole 
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community, including the “other-than-human persons organized into congeries of societies 
alongside Indigenous peoples” (Callicot 1989: 14). So while, for James Grijalva, environmental 
justice means “achieving a level of environmental quality adequate for Indigenous people to 
practice and maintain their self-defi ned cultural relation to the land and natural environment,” 
we must remember that this must also include achieving justice for the totality of their peopled 
communities (2012: 26). In order to affi  rm this totality, we must respect and defer to Native 
names, along with the relationships and knowledges they tenderly bear into the more-than-
human world (Atleo 2011; Cajete 2000; LaDuke 1999, 2005; Rose 1992; Schreyer et al. 2014; 
Whitt 2009; Wildcat 2009). 
Indigenous Philosophy(ies) of Naming
Because environmental justice depends on affi  rming Indigenous communities, we now con-
sider how Native American names, naming ceremonies, and practices play a crucial role in 
establishing, maintaining, and protecting Native communities, and persons within communi-
ties (Norton-Smith 2010). But a work of this scope on naming runs the risk of, as Joshua Nelson 
puts it, erasing “the diversity within the diversities of indigeneity” (2014, 28). So instead of 
making universal claims about Indigenous naming as such, I attempt to amplify the voices of 
Indigenous scholars and allies, providing a few leading but contingent characteristics or princi-
ples that might serve as a guide, pointing toward the vaster affi  rmations within complex, Native 
American namings. 
Names always come from and affi  rm peopled communities. In Th e Dance of Person and Place, 
Norton-Smith provides a rich account of Shawnee child-naming practices and ceremonies that 
explicate this principle. In these ceremonies, new members of the Shawnee community are 
named and given um’soma affi  liations, ten days aft er birth, by a number of the tribe’s elders 
or other respected persons. In Shawnee life, um’somaki are name groups that represent “vari-
ous kinds of or characteristics of nonhuman animals” (2010: 103). Each tribal member belongs 
to one um’soma, is affi  liated with one animal, and shares comradery and companionship with 
other members of their um’soma. 
Nine days aft er a child’s birth, two elders, chosen by the family, are asked to spend one night 
praying and dreaming about the character and traits that each animal’s um’somaki represent, and 
to let names appear to them. On the morning of the tenth day, aft er a name occurs to the elders, 
the elders present the names that came to them, clarifying which um’somak the name belongs to, 
and retell the characteristics and habits of those animals. Once the parents choose which of the 
names they prefer, thanks are off ered to the animals for their wisdom and power.
Here, one’s community is both the condition for and the result of a naming—and commu-
nity includes the human persons, land, ecosystems, and animals whose um’somaki bind them 
together. Th e continued placement of children in these um’somaki is imperative to continue 
those creaturely relations. If names and the um’somaki change, then those relationships are 
distanced, dulled, or broken. In fact, naming practices, language, words, and names, and the 
objects, persons, and relations to which they refer are all considered alive and aff ective entities, 
part of a single community that names facilitate and result from.
Naming ceremonies and practices are themselves agents. Both are agential, equal parts of the 
community, as they are responsible for the actual giving and bestowing of a name (Bang and 
Marin 2015; Norton-Smith 2010). Native naming practices and ceremonies are oft en those in 
which “aspects of the natural world (e.g., places and concepts) are assigned names which become 
semiotic signs of nature–culture relations” (Bang and Marin 2015: 536). Th e naming ceremony, 
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when done appropriately and respectfully by the correct people, “creates a bond between the 
name and its bearer, giving the name the power to care for and transform the bearer” (Nor-
ton-Smith 2010: 104). It is the ceremony—which is composed of a community, a name, rela-
tives, and an um’somaki—that bestows the name with power, setting the name into relation with 
the name bearer. In other words, the naming ceremony is in part responsible for facilitating 
or enacting the community. Th e “creative act of naming” brings bodies into relation with one 
another (Cajete 2000 181). Citing Gregory Cajete, Bang and Marin conclude that “knowing and 
building a relationship with land occurs through the ‘creative act’ of naming” which can make 
visible “conceptual and relational realities” (2015: 536).
As agents, naming ceremonies teach respectful, epistemological practices. Contrary to Western 
naming, in which names can be applied to any old thing, no matter how distant or abstract, acts 
of Native naming teach that it is not just inappropriate and presumptive but also impossible to 
name distant or abstract relations that one does not know, care for, or regularly engage with. 
Indigenous ways of knowing exchange the apprehension of external and settled states of aff airs 
for respectful and responsible participation with other lives. A name situates the name bearer in 
a network of relations, outside of which the name does not make sense.
Names thus result from respectful observations of and participation with, not power over, other 
agents. Native names and their ceremonies place “communication and reciprocity with natural 
environments—rather than the desire to dominate or to establish ‘truth claims’ about those 
environments—at the very heart of the production of knowledge and wisdom.” Knowledge of 
the named creatures comes about through attentiveness and respect, not control (Hester and 
Cheney 2001: 324; see also Norton-Smith 2010). Tim Ingold highlights this characteristic in 
his discussion of the Koyukon of Alaska and their animal communities. Ingold suggests that 
the animal people get their names through the character traits they express. Creatures are not 
named by humans, per se, but appear to name themselves through their own enactments, hab-
its, personal narratives, and individual life stories. For example, “stares into the water” (ospreys) 
and “knocked the swan down” (green-winged teal) get their names from their own life activ-
ities and self-actualization (2011: 170–171). Th e latter name comes from a story passed down 
through the Koyukon and still enacted (retold) every time Knocked the Swan Down too hast-
ily and carelessly takes off  from the water, disturbing and tipping resting creatures. Instead of 
abstractly bestowing a name upon a creature based on, for example, the discoverer’s name, the 
creaturely people in the Koyukon community perform and enact their own names. Th ey are 
agents. When communities refer or speak to these peoples, they respectfully use these names, 
retelling the stories from which they come. In fact, Ingold calls these names “miniature stories” 
or “episodes of stories”: encountering a name is to encounter and experience a story about one 
way of being in the world (172). Th ese names then off er real information about the ecological 
relations in the world. 
Native naming is governed by humility. Th e Koyukon fi rst witness practices of self-naming 
or agency in which other bodies in their communities name themselves through their stories, 
actions, songs, and lifeways. Th en, as these storied names are passed down within the Koyu-
kon community, the Koyukon respectfully recognize and refer to these creatures through their 
self-appointed names. Th eir own role in this naming practice is one of humility: to see and 
call as the creatures see and call themselves. In her poem “Naming the Animals,” Linda Hogan 
affi  rms this Native practice of recognizing the names of others over alternative methods such 
as the biblical telling of Adam’s naming of the animals. Of course, Adam’s method of naming—
basically just point a fi nger and make a sound—is also the model of scientifi c naming enabled 
by power over rather than relationship with. For Hogan, Adam’s naming model is ludicrous: “as 
if [the animals] had not been there / before his words, had not / had other tongues and powers 
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/ or sung themselves into life / before him” (1993: 40). As Leanne Simpson reminds us, “true 
engagement requires consent” from “all beings involved” (2014: 15).
Trial and error are important parts of naming and becoming. Such is the case in William 
Smith’s Alsea telling of the naming of the animal peoples. As Smith tells it, “Coyote kept on 
saying, ‘I want that all the people should put on this horn. I want to see whom the horn will 
fi t best.’” Notice that the animals are included in the designation ‘people,’ reminding us that 
Native ethical communities are composed of nonhumans. As each person (or people group) 
unsuccessfully tries on the horn, Coyote off ers them names according to their practices: “Th en 
crane put it on. He walked around, but attempted to go into the ocean. Th e Coyote said to him: 
‘It does not look good on thee, take it off . Th y name will be just crane. Th ou wilt habitually wade 
around for mudcats (catfi sh). Continuous-Wader shall be thy name’” (quoted in 2012: 34). Th e 
animals thus are not essential entities in the world, before their namings; they become who they 
are through specifi c acts and are named accordingly.
Names are context specifi c. Western philosophy has obsessed about the diff erence between 
proper and improper names. In Native philosophies, names are proper insofar as they refer to 
specifi c bodies. But they might also refer to animals, whose names are both proper and com-
mon (Coyote, Raven, Spider). At the same time, individuals are oft en named aft er places, even 
as those places are named aft er other animals or relations, and so on (Basso 1996; Schreyer et 
al. 2014). Native names disrupt the stable diff erences between personal, proper names and col-
lective, group names; the name depends on whom and how you encounter (Ingold 2011: 171). 
Th is requires listeners to engage and fi nd out context, but it also affi  rms that being a person and 
being a collective, or in a set of relations, are interrelated.
Names themselves are agents. Names are not mere words or abstract signs that agential minds 
enact on dormant bodies. Nor are names important only because of the animal person, attri-
bute, or other namesake they convey. According to Norton-Smith, the name bearers, naming 
community, and namesakes are all “animate entities,” but so too are the ceremonies and prac-
tices that bestow the names, as well as names themselves (2010: 204). Names have real power 
as independent agents: they are living, aff ective, agential entities who exist in relationships with 
other agents and have real, concrete power in the world on their own terms (Bang et al. 2014; 
Bang and Marin 2015). To be an agent, or to have agency, is to actively and selectively partici-
pate with one’s environment (Bang and Marin 2015: 24). Names, along with thoughts, dreams, 
and stories, as well as all manner of persons (human, plant, animal, etc.) count as animate, as 
agents. For Norton-Smith, since all of the entities are animate agents, they all display traits of 
personhood (2010: 7). For this reason, the mutual consent and respect of all agents are imper-
ative if relations are to stand (Simpson 2014). When names and the relations they refer to are 
not respected, things could go poorly for the named individual or the ceremony participants, or 
perhaps the name will refuse to stick (Norton-Smith 2010). When chosen wisely, a name “is an 
animate entity that takes care of its bearer (104). 
Finally, Native American names refer to relations rather than strictly individuals. Naming does 
not so much distinguish or individuate one body from others, but instead connects, situates and 
embeds bodies amongst their instantiating, enabling, cohabiting, co-constituting others. When 
summarizing Western theories, Steve Martinot suggests Western naming “individuates what it 
points out by setting it apart.” Th is processes of individuation is totalizing because by separating 
a thing from its background, and by clarifying its boundaries, one makes it into a whole. Th is 
supposes that naming merely “gives presence, or brings to light what is already there awaiting 
individuation and discernment through an added articulation.”
But from an American Indian epistemological perspective, recognizing that there are no 
“neutral facts,” this represents a fundamental misconception about the order of operations. It 
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seems that naming, as a theory of individuation, must actually presuppose the very self-present, 
boundaried individual it believes itself only to be perceiving. It merely “points to something 
one already has in mind” (2006: 28). To borrow Maria Lugones’s, phrasing, it is only by onto-
logically assuming the existence of individual unities—beginning with the belief that “the world 
of people and things is unifi ed”—that our naming practices serve to extract, diff erentiate, and 
individuate (1994: 465).
Of course, Native names also clarify, address, and identify something. Indeed, American 
Indian naming is hyperattentive to making-present (Bang and Marin 2015: 536). Just as Western 
naming begins with the individual, and through a “complex series of fi ctions” convinces itself to 
have discovered this unity, Native philosophy also assumes the unit of measurement it believes 
itself to name (Lugones 1994: 464). But there are major diff erences. First, Indigenous namers 
not only recognize but explicitly thematize their role in creating meaning in order to know 
responsibly without assuming their knowledge perfectly captures the world (Norton-Smith 
2010). Indigenous epistemologies do not deploy a series of fi ctions to make their truth universal. 
Second, what they assume and make present are “relational realities” (Bang and Marin 2015: 
536). Names do not function to pull out stable bodies, or totalize by “separating something 
from its background” (Martinot 2016: 28). Instead, names identify nodes, axes, concrescences, 
or intersections in a spider web. Th ese axes cannot be reduced to the mere addition of smaller, 
component parts (like owl+tree, where owl and tree are individuals added together). Nor is 
the name-bearing node a boundaried fi xture, extractable from the vaster network in which it 
belongs. Rupert Ross, in collaboration with the Mi’kmaq, claims that Indigenous peoples have 
“a habit of thinking relationally, i.e., understanding between-ness to give rise to (at least tempo-
rary) fi xities/‘things’” rather than assuming a world of atomistic things from the outset (2004: 6). 
Names still refer to particular people. But the personhood revealed is fundamentally rela-
tional. Persons are always persons-in-relations or individuals-in-relation. Western philosophy 
sees and picks out individuals, while Native philosophies see relations, groupings. Consider Son 
of Raven (Clutesi 1967), Standing Bear (2006), or even Coyote (Frachtenberg 2012). To assume 
that these names pick out individuals is to start from an ontological position that assumes unity. 
Instead, Son of Raven, Standing Bear, and Coyote name places in relational nodes that have 
their own character and characteristics but are nevertheless not abstract or extractable. 
Th ird and fi nally, the individuals-in-relations made present in these names are understood 
as contingent and shift ing, open to change, rather than fi xed and permanent. Th is is in part 
because many names pick out relations that may shift  over time (Basso 1996). Th e boreal owls 
in Koyukon territory are not named just because they perch but because they perch in a certain 
place on a certain kind of tree (Ingold 2011: 272). A rock spring in Apache territory named 
Tliish Bi Tu’e (Snake’s Water) would presumably be named otherwise if inhabited by frogs. 
Relational shift s or new relational entities are marked by new names and renaming ceremonies 
(Norton-Smith 2010). 
But this is also because many Native names pick out actions, where actions are contingent 
and agential rather than fi xed and instinctual. For example, Koyukon animal names pick out 
actions in the world rather than fi xed identities. Th e mink’s name is “bites things in water, spot-
ted sandpipers are “fl utters around the shore,” boreal owls are “perches on the lower part of 
spruce trees” (Ingold 2011: 169). Verb-derived names refer to a kind of doing, or a set of actions, 
or habits, which are in process and changeable, rather static individuals fi xed in time and space 
(Frachtenberg 2012; Ingold 2011; Ross 2004). To behold an animal person is not to observe an 
object that is then perceived to act. It is “to glimpse a moment of activity that may subsequently 
be resolved into an objective form.” In Koyukon ontology, “each animal is the instantiation of 
a particular way of being alive” and a mere “concentration of potential . . . in the entire fi eld of 
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relations that is life itself ” (2011: 170). Indigenous names are “more frequently verb-centered, 
trying to emphasize not the thing-aspect of Creation but the pattern, fl ow and function aspect” 
(Ross 2004). In this way, bodies become visible not as minks but rather through the activity of 
“minking.” 
Recovering “Proper” Names: Environmental Justice
When named respectfully, Native names affi  rm and create ecological relations, educate their 
users on Native relational ontologies, and enact Indigenous ways of knowing in resistance to 
settler/ed knowledges. Th ey are thus crucial for decolonizing the environmental movement and 
for affi  rming the bonds between Native Americans and their peopled communities. Th is fi nal 
section will look at three ways in which recovering or using Native names is important for envi-
ronmental justice.
 First, reclaiming Indigenous names of people (humans, land, or animals) restores those bod-
ies to their relational networks of respect and care (Bang and Marin 2015; Bang et al. 2014). 
Names can bring these kinships or axes into being (again). Even as we affi  rm Native naming, 
we must be careful not to treat its decolonizing eff ect as mere metaphor (Alfred 2012; Tuck and 
Yang 2012). Settlers (especially in environmental movements) have a long and troubled history 
of using both discourses of decolonization and justice, and of stealing Native stories and words, 
while simultaneously supporting settler practices of land occupation and use (Whitt 2009). Eth-
notopography, a popular anthropological habit in the early 1900s, more frequently than not 
failed the Native American communities they intended to serve, sometimes despite the author’s 
best eff orts, and exposed Native lifeways and worlds to the colonial gaze (Deloria 1999; Standing 
Bear 2006; Th ornton 1997). Th is led to a Native cultural and linguistic extraction and eradica-
tion (Deloria 2007; Rose 1992; Whitt 2009). Foregrounding Native naming without address-
ing material redistribution affi  rms settler ideology. Much like language of reconciliation, such 
gestures might “relegate all committed injustices to the past while attempting to legitimate the 
status quo” (Corntassel et al. 2009: 145), ignoring other aspects of justice, including widespread 
recognition and respect of traditional tribal and spiritual practices, Indigenous sovereignty, par-
ticipation in the political decision-making process, fi nancial transfers and redistribution, and 
so on (Alfred 2005).
Yet, without these names, supposed settler allies fi nd themselves “paying lip service to the 
Indigenous peoples of the region while subsequently reinscribing settler names and histories 
on the landscapes” (Snelgrove et al. 2014, 16). Furthermore, for many Native American peoples 
who do not strictly separate the material from the nonmaterial (Bang and Marin 2015; Deloria 
2007; Wildcat 2009), names are part of the material fi ght against environmental erasure and 
ecological injustice. Restoring the proper names of places and peoples not only makes Indige-
nous lives and relations visible in the present, advancing what Bang et al. (2014) call Indigenous 
“time-space relations,” thus resisting settler temporalities that would relegate them to the past 
(Bang and Marin 2015). Th ey are also part of land reclamation and revitalization, affi  rming 
Indigenous knowledges and embedding individuals in the relations to which the names refer 
(Bang et al. 2014; Bang and Marin 2015; Corntassel et al. 2009; Schreyer et al. 2014). Recall 
that names are agents that actively situate bodies back in networks of power with land, rivers, 
places, and peoples (Bang et al. 2014; Bang and Marin 2015). Th ese naming practices are a mode 
of resistance against settler coloniality because they have the power to establish communities, 
connect entities to one another, and affi  rm future-oriented relations; they “make present certain 
relational realities” (Bang and Marin 2015: 538). Names enact the relations. 
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Speaking precisely to the reconnection brought about by these names, people of the Taku 
River Tlingit First Nation, in what settlers call Alaska and northern Canada, have worked to 
compile an online, interactive map of their territory with Tlingit names, meanings, and stories. 
Community member Louise Gordon suggested using Tlingit names helps people “get into a 
good rhythm with the land,” and Susan Carlick claims of this renaming, “I think that our land 
would appreciate it” (quoted in Schreyer et al. 2014). Th ese statements assert that (right) names 
possess the power to situate their bearers and namers back in real, and not simply imagined or 
abstract, relation to one another. Th ey understand this naming to have real eff ects on not only 
the people but also the land, places, and rivers. 
Bang and Marin make naming of place and peoples one of their central principles for deset-
tling colonial nature-culture relations (2015: 536). Th ey describe several moments in which an 
Indigenous name of a plant, river, or spot of land situated Indigenous peoples in the present 
and in relation to lands. First, Bang and Marin recount a moment in which a Miami teacher, 
Robert, helps students to understand the ontological stances refl ected in Miami names, where 
“water-animal relationships [are] imbued in language.” Th e use of the Miami name sikaakwa 
for the Chicago River, combined with the teacher’s explanation of the river’s meandering, con-
nections with other rivers, and land relations, allow the river to become visible as a network of 
changing, aff ective relations. Th is naming thus allows a “counter-mapping” that turns Indige-
nous ways of knowing into discourses of resistance against settler temporalities (537). Sikaakwa, 
roughly translatable as “pungent onion,” even clarifi es that the river was named for the onion 
plants that dotted its shores. Here, Bang and Marin clarify that by naming places “through the 
use of Indigenous languages,” these teachers construct “non-humans as agentic place makers” in 
networks of ongoing—which is to say, contemporary—relations with the listeners (356). 
We already see the second way in which Native names are important for environmental jus-
tice. Native names are caretakers of ecological knowledge about the relationships between the 
creatures, lands, plants, forces, and humans that have composed Native American communities 
but have been obscured, cut away, or paved over by settler lifestyles and economics. For Indige-
nous communities to be treated justly, we must recognize that “community” refers to the more-
than-human world and that justice must mean learning of and restoring or otherwise caring for 
the ecological relations of the other bodies in those lands.
Th e importance of ecological knowledge in restoring ethical, just relations to Native commu-
nities is represented by two of the four primary principles guiding the Tlingit eff ort to restore 
names to their homeland (and restore their homeland): (1) place names teach you how to respect 
the land, and (2) place names teach you about the land (Schreyer et a l. 2014.) Th e former 
reminds us that place names come with stories that contain long-held knowledge and details 
about lands, creatures, and how to respect them. For example, Tlingit elders recall that the name 
of their old summer campgrounds near Mount Á a Tlein (Altein, in English, and Tlingit for Big 
Lake) called “Wé inaa, which means alkali or where caribou used to come for salt lick” (Nyman 
and Jeer 1993; Schreyer et al. 2014, 107). But according to Tlingit community member Andrew 
Williams, these names came from stories that taught Tlingit young how to respect the active, 
seasonal relationship between these entities—the mountain with the lake, the lake with the car-
ibou (Schreyer et al. 2014). Without these names, those stories and their knowledges disappear.
Th e second principle, that names teach you about the land, is formulated by Tlingit them-
selves: “Age-old Tlingit place names, as poetic as they are practical, carry valuable ecological and 
survival information. Place names represent locations where fi sh spawn, where moose come 
to drink, where edible fern roots could be found” (Schreyer et al. 2014, 108). Tlingit member 
David Moss recalls the oddity of a particular European island renaming that erased knowledge 
the ecosystem and its habitants: “But Teresa Island, I don’t know who Teresa is, but it used to 
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be Goat Island right? Th at gives you a better idea of what’s on that island” (quoted in Schreyer 
et al. 2014, 124). In his encounters with Apache elder Charles, Keith Basso (1996) is told that 
many of the place names in western Apache territory refer to waters that have long been dry. 
As so many place names do (Basso 1996; 2005), these names off er knowledge about the healthy 
relations between islands and goats, caribou and salt, moose and rivers. Without the knowledge 
contained in those names, how can we achieve justice for the entire Tlingit community, and not 
just its humans? 
In another example, we fi nd that creaturely names within the Anishinaabe language appeal 
to relations outside of settler colonial knowledges (Bang and Marin 2015). In this example, 
by using the Anishinaabe language to describe a dead tree as an entity with an ongoing rela-
tionships to the ecosystem, two young Indigenous boys and their mom construct important, 
desettled, ecological knowledge about the kinship of all lives. About this renaming, Bang and 
Marin suggest that “this is a remarkable ontological transformation of the presumed possible 
relations between humans and non-humans as distinct and separate that was present when the 
interactional medium was English. We suggest the use of Anishinabe language (Ojibwemowin) 
supported relational perspectives between humans and non-humans” (540).
Th e ecological relations made present in these names provide much-needed knowledge 
about restoring and aiding creatures and places that have been devastated by settler technolo-
gies or neglect. It is knowledge of relations invisibilized under Western naming schemas. Yet as 
valuable as those knowledges are, Indigenous naming is not focused on returning things to the 
“past.” Despite the long histories of these Native naming practices, they are not sedimented in an 
idyllic, pre-settler past, but continue to inform the very lively, very present naming practices of 
Indigenous peoples in resistance to settler names and the colonial, individualist ontologies they 
represent. Because Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies tend to be built on change and 
fl exibility, rather than fi xity and essences, American Indian worlds can encounter new problems 
and integrate new ideas into the groups without breaking the system (Deloria 2007; Standing 
Bear 2006). Native names off er ways of moving forward, even in places where the land and its 
inhabitants have been violently altered. Th is fl exibility allows them to meet devastating circum-
stances in ways that still affi  rm their ontologies (Deloria 2007: 13). 
Bang and colleagues’ quest to rename their “plant relatives” as well as invasive species high-
lights how important it is to include Native Americans in the categorization of new relations, 
entities, and knowledges. Speaking about the process for this naming, the authors
recognized our use of the term invasive species signaled a particular epistemic and ontologi-
cal stance to youth—a western science one specifi cally—and not one that we intended. Th us, 
the term invasive species placed buckthorn, and other plants that were forcibly migrated to 
Chicago, outside our design principle around naming our plant relatives because while they 
may not have been our relatives, the term disposed them as relatives to any humans. (2014: 
11). 
We again see that Native namings refl ect ethical knowing and relational ontologies even when 
they need to create new names and designations for creatures. Bang et al. resist the settler colo-
nial border, nationalist, and police logics that name various new-coming plants “invasive spe-
cies,” a name that would essentialize, and individualize bodies as culprit. Instead, Bang and 
company affi  rm the Indigenous epistemological principle that knowing means knowing rightly 
and in accordance with a relational ontologies, and name them “plants that people lost their 
relationships with” (11).
 Here we also fi nd Indigenous naming themes at work. As Coyote taught us about the value 
of trial and error in naming (Frachtenberg 2012), Bang et al. tried out a few names to see what 
Righting Names  103
fi t best: “We ‘fi shed around’ to fi nd a name centered in our own epistemic and ontological cen-
ters” (2014: 11). And as we learned from the Lakota, Koyukon, Mi’kmaq, and Blackfoot, names 
are oft en based on verbs and actions, rather than static identities. Bang et al. also name plant 
relatives through their actions, and specifi cally, the losing of relationships. Rather than violent 
and eradicatory responses, this name makes present a tenderness and concern for the plants and 
their relational networks.
Th is refl ection on “plants that people lost their relationship with” points toward the third way 
in which Indigenous names are crucial for environmental justice: using Native names elucidates 
relational violences that exceed the harms to “individuals.” Given our focus on relations, this 
point is by now already intuitive, so we can be brief. One cannot isolate harms in Indigenous 
ontologies. If you harm Wé inaa (alkali, where caribou used to come for salt lick), you harm 
the caribou (Nyman and Jeer 1993; Schreyer et al. 2014). If you harm Sheshikmaoshike sepe or 
Sikaakwa (rivers), you will harm the entire network to which they are connected, including the 
stinking onions and fl owing maples. And if you harm these, you harm the Native people who 
were and are embedded in these communities. 
Conclusion 
Working with Native American thinkers, I have tried to explicate the robust philosophies of 
naming at work in American Indian practices and to demonstrate their importance for better 
and more just environmental management practices and ecological futures. So what does settler 
responsibility actually look like? 
Maybe we begin with recognizing the names we have been given: “yonega is a Tsalagi (Cher-
okee) term for white settlers, which connotes ‘foam of the water; moved by wind and without 
its own direction; clings to everything that’s solid.’” Th e Dakota use the term “wasicu . . . which 
means ‘taker of fat.’” In the northwest of Turtle Island, where I am a guest, “hwunitum is a 
Hul’qumi’num and SENĆ OŦEN word for settler, that some have described as ‘the hungry peo-
ple’” (Snelgrove 2014: 16). Accepting these identifi cations means recognizing we are not mere 
individuals, but are already seen by and situated within a network of relations to which we are 
accountable. Why begin here? Because responsibility cannot only mean a feel-good solidarity 
with, but must, more substantially, mean a responsibility, accountability, or even deferral to. 
Th is responsibility-to means that yonega recognize that struggles to reclaim Indigenous place 
and species names are serious political and ethical struggles about who has the power to tend 
to or use environmental resources and in what ways. Th us, deferring to and taking up Native 
names is part of a “commitment to the fundamental concept of sovereignty” for Native Ameri-
cans (Lomawaima 2007), especially sovereignty over their own lands and relational networks (in 
which we are also embedded, if oft en in negative ways). When we do not defer to Native names 
and knowledges they contain, even attempts at partnership or collaboration between Native 
Americans and Western scientists can end up “supplanting Indigenous peoples as legitimate 
knowers” of wildlife, ecological patterns, etc. (Watson 2013: 1099). As long as natural spaces, 
ecological problems, and environmental victories are understood through and measured in 
colonial terms and names, environmental resources, political power, and material distribution 
will lay the hands of the yonega (Snelgrove et al. 2014).
But American Indian eff orts to rename also attempt to rekindle or bring into being the rela-
tionships obscured or broken by settler lifeways. To this end, settler responsibility to right names 
is also an epistemic responsibility to attend other lives in their instantiating relations, not essen-
tial identities (Simpson 2014: 8). Deferring to Native American names refuses the impulse to 
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see ourselves, or any other creature, as situated outside of or as removed from named relations: 
for “the environment” is not “something outside of, surrounding a people,” but fundamentally 
“a part of the people” (Whitt 2009: 43). If we want to combat settler violence against Indige-
nous and creaturely peoples, we must rightly name the bodies-in-relation, human and non, with 
whom we co-make our worlds (even if those names are not in our language). We must insist on 
the right names of the places, peoples, creatures with whom we cohabit, and demand that these 
names and the relations they facilitate become central to environmental movements so that they 
can unsettle our relations and habits with human and nonhumans alike (Bang and Marin 2015). 
“May it soon be usefully so” (Basso 1996: xvii).
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  NOTE
 1. I almost exclusively cite Native American authors. I know that much Western literature, especially 
anthropology, has treated American Indians as others to be exposed and undressed before the West-
ern gaze. Every non-Indigenous scholar I cite (other than non-Indigenous coauthors) was fi rst cited 
as a positive resource by Native Americans. I also did extra research to clarify whether they were col-
laborating with Native American peoples and attending to their voices and preferences. For example, 
I encountered Tim Ingold in the work of Bang and Marin (2014), and further research confi rmed that 
he is a resource used positively by many Native scholars. Many texts were excluded from this litera-
ture review because their claims were clearly at the expense of, and not in the interests of, the Native 
stories and persons about which they spoke. 
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